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INTRODUCTION

The analytical systems of the classical economists, Smith, Ricardo,
Marx and their contemporaries, were unduly complicated by their
reliance on the labor theory of value. The marginalist revision
of the latter third of the 19th century, by equating value and market price, moved toward a "solution" of the analytical difficulties
encountered in a labor theory and before the end of the century,
the economic analyst could make the statement that, given a competitive economic system in which price is equal to cost of production, it follows that the allocation of resources in the system is an
optimum.'
* Mr. Pontecorvo is a Professor of Economics and Banking at the
Graduate School of Business, Columbia University; a member of the
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1. In economic theory, a "normal profit" is included in the costs. The
adequacy and shortcomings of this concept of optinality-generally called
Pareto Optimum-has been dealt with extensively.
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This paper will consider one aspect of the valuation problem.

The focus is on the implications of rapid changes in the value
of ocean and ocean related resources on social control (man-

agement) of ocean activity. Most often, economists, in order to
analyze a problem, use the concept of equilibrium under static or
comparative static conditions.2 However, it is the dynamics of
the rapidly changing (increasing) value of ocean resources that is
one of the driving forces behind the rising interest in ocean manage-

ment programs. Accordingly, these changes will be considered in a
dynamic framework with due consideration to the related methodological difficulties.
DISEQUILIBRIUM IN THE EcoNoIcs OF THE OcEANs

The nature of these dynamics may be suggested by a simple
model, expressed in non-quantitative terms, that will help sort out
the complexities of the ocean environment. This approach will allow conceptualization of the issues. But in using this model, it
should be borne in mind that it must accommodate different national
positions as well as the dynamics of changes in the value of ocean
resources. This forces the model to a high level of generalization
and eliminates any possibility of measurement and quantification.
Despite these limitations, the authors believe the model is useful in
organizing our thinking about the ocean resource problem.
To begin, it may be assumed that the economic system (income
and output) is growing at an approximately constant growth rate
(compound rate of growth).8 It may be further assumed that the
demand for ocean space and ocean resources is growing at least as
fast as the overall economic system. A significant influence on demand will be the "income elasticity" of demand, the measure of
the response of demand to a change in income. Here we will assume that the income elastisity of demand for ocean resources is
positive and high. This means that as the system grows (income
and output increase), the demand for ocean resources will grow
even faster than the GNP. As indicated in Appendix I, there is
considerable evidence which is consistent with this assumption, even
though, eventually, stronger evidence than a simple inspection of
data will have to be developed.
2. In simplest form, a static analysis starts with a position of equilibrium-analogous to such a position in mechanics-and analyzes the
forces of supply and demand that yield the equilibrium. Comparative statics is the examination of the changes in equilibrium positions resulting
from changes in the underlying forces.
3. This assumption can be easily verified by looking at long term aggregate economic data.
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Against the growth on the demand side is an increasing scarcity
of supply. The usual description of scarcity is in terms of increasing costs, diminishing returns. The concept of diminishing returns
involves the idea of pushing on a frontier-or margin. A fixed
factor to which ever increasing quantities of variable inputs are
applied will ultimately result in diminishing returns, i.e., increasing costs of production per unit of output. A fixed stock of fish
which is attacked by an ever growing fishing fleet is one way of vis-

ualizing diminishing returns.
However, such a vision of diminishing returns leading to economic calamity, while often invoked, is much too simplistic to be meaningful. There are two main forces that keep driving the wolf of
diminishing returns away from the door-at least as far as the
street. These two are, of course, technological change which tends
to lower costs and the substitution of one good for another if the
price of one rises relative to another.
In the long run, in the Western economies, these two factors have
operated to more than overcome diminishing returns. But, long
run tendencies do not suffice to explain all problems, and, in the
short run and in particular segments of the economic system, increasing costs may present a real problem in management. Such
seems to be the case with the oceans at the moment. It should
also be emphasized that the condition of keeping the wolf from the
door requires a high rate of technological change, a condition that
suggests the importance of investment in research in ocean management problems.
Given the assumption of disproportionate increases in demand
and relative scarcity, an upward price movement, and a rise in
the value of the stock of oceanic resources should be observed. 4
Again, the Appendix indicates some limited evidence on those phenomena. Thus, in the short run and in the absence of any visible
massive changes in technology or rapidly developing substitutes for
ocean resource, the price of ocean resources may reasonably be expected to continue to rise, since the shifting demand curve and the
inelastic supply function combine to yield a dynamic disequilibrium
situation. Such disproportionate movements in prices create shifts
4. This suggests a first approximation to a definition of disequilibrium.
In the foreseeable future, limited technological change and substitution
possibilities will result in price movements which do not converge towards
an equilibrium.

in the relative shares of income and emphasize problems of income
distribution.
This condition of disequilibrium should be recognized as the salient feature of today's economics of the oceans. The model suggests
that a legal system that fails to provide the necessary flexibility to
accommodate future changes in value and future problems of distribution of income will court major economic difficulties and instability.
THE DEmAND FOR OCEAN RESOURCES

The growing catch value of living resources, the increasing value of deposits of hydrocarbons and mineral resources, the rapid
rise in the price of coastal real estate, the conflicts arising from
multiple use of the restricted space in coastal zones, the changing
role of ocean transport, and the growth in other uses of the ocean
are one source of the growing participation and tension in international and national debates on the uses of the oceans.
In the long run, changes in the rate of economic activity and
the entry and departure of new 'businesses or even new industries are
in themselves neither a reason for dislocations in the economic system nor a reason for conflict and heightened interest. A steady
growth pattern (technically speaking, a slow upward shift in the
demand and supply functions) will reallocate resources, change
resource use and generate new equilibrium prices and quantities
without conflict.
However, problems associated with changes in economic conditions may indeed arise for any of several reasons. Almost any
change, if too rapid, will cause significant economic dislocation because the normal processes of adjustment (the mobility of capital
and labor, and the substitution of one good for another) operate
with a lag. Too rapid a change may, therefore, go beyond the system's capacity to adjust in the given time frame.
A second source of trouble is when the supply and demand conditions do not shift together. These shifts will result in price fluctuations which, if substantial, may be disequilibrating. An illustration of this effect is the impact of wide swings in the world price
of fishmeal resulting from either supply or demand changes on the
foreign exchange position of Peru.
As has been noted, the principle force on the demand side
is embodied in the concept of income elasticity. This may be
clearly seen in the demand for ocean space for recreation in the
coastal zone. The rising level of demand for sport fishing, second
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homes and attractive beaches all reflect the rising affluence of
society and our concomitant concern with the quality of life. Less
obvious but also important in the demand for coastal zone ocean
space is the impact of increases in GNP on the demand by industrial
and public sector users.
Income and population growth require more transportation,
power generation and the full range of output and services required to support the rising standard of living. Since population
and industry have historically occupied and utilized the coastal
zone because it offered lower operating costs, their growth tends
to add significantly to the demand for coastal zone ocean space.
This litany may be extended to a wide range of industrial activities-for example, the development of superports, additional
refineries and the demands on ocean space for the transport of
petroleum products and liquified natural gas.
THE ScARcrrY OF OCEAN REsouRcEs
The 19th century view of ocean resources was that they were
inexhaustible, i.e., the supply functions for the resources then in
greatest demand-fish and transportation-were infinitely elastic.5

By the

1880's the

fisheries management

problem

had

emerged. However, while from the turn of the century, and even
before, specific fisheries were in trouble, the general problem of
scarcity was concealed by the extensive growth of fisheries in general.
Accurate assessment of the physical dimensions of the depletion problem in Alaska was made much more difficult by the
dual nature of the expansion of the fishery-geographically and
in terms of the species exploited. Examination of the literature
on the Alaskan fishery clearly indicates this extension process.
In its most generalized form it involved a shift from a red salmon
fishery to a red, pink, and chum salmon fishery. 6
Since 1945 the opportunity for extensive growth in supply has
been steadily diminishing, while the upsurge in world trade and
the drive for industrialization in all nations, together with the
greatly increased ability to utilize and exploit resources that has
resulted from rapid technological advance, have greatly increased
5. Infinite elasticity refers to a situation in which any desired quantity
of the good in question may be purchased for the same price per unit.
6. J. CRUTCHIIELD & G. Pox EcoRvo, THE PAciFc SALmoN FrSnmxsH
61-62 (1969).

demand. This moved the scarcity issue from the wings to center
stage.
Today, the ocean community is slowly coming to grips with the
concept that ocean resources are indeed exhaustible. It is now
widely accepted that certain resources like the output of reproductive stocks, the throughput capacity of straits and the ability of
7
the ocean to ingest pollution without damage are limited.
Despite the emergence of this view of ocean space, policies continue to treat the oceans as if the supply of resources were infinitely
elastic, and as if expectations of future price changes were zero.
As long as the demand was far below the level of the stock or its
regenerative abilities, the above assumption was a satisfactory approximation to reality. But as the resources' potential is diminished,
a resource allocation system must change to adapt to the new supply
conditions.
As long as the assumption of a perfectly elastic supply is maintained when such is not the case, the rationing of use has to be
by some sort of bargaining (non-price) basis. This rationing process may take many forms and even be involuntary as is true of the
congestion in straits and on beaches. Usually, however, it takes
the form of interstate compacts, bilateral or multilateral fishery
agreements, and treaties on pollution.
In addition, the strong and rapidly increasing interdependence of
different uses is further complicating the issue. Stated in simple
terms, the supply of ocean resources is increasingly scarce (becoming more inelastic in supply) not only because of each resource's own characteristics but also because the ocean uses are not
independent nor are their supply conditions. Thus, besides rationing different users of the same resources, there also exists the
necessity of rationing different uses in relation to each other.
Without knowing how different uses impinge upon each other,
the price system is not very effective in allocating ocean resources.
The inadequacy of the price mechanism forces the allocation mechanism back into the bargaining process with the usually resulting
allocative inefficiency.
At this point it is appropriate to digress and spell out several
options available for resource allocation of goods and services.
7. It is instructive that managerial practices derived under conditions
of scarcity common in other areas are just now being imposed on the uses

of ocean space. For example, air traffic has long been controlled around
busy airports. Systems of this type are only now coming into use in harbors and straits. A single engine aircraft may have more electronic equip-

ment for communication and control than some very large vessels.
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As noted earlier, a certain pattern of income distribution and the
assumption of a competitive market will yield an optimum allocation. If there is reason to believe that the market will not yield
the defined optimum, one may fall back to a second best solution,
for example, a market solution which may be constrained in various ways by regulating, a de facto rationing by congestion, purely
political allocation and others.
In all these second best solutions, it is important to consider the
nature of the decision making matrix and the costs of decision
making. In general, purely political decision making is more
costly, and less responsive to the underlying economic and physical reality. This is particularly true at the international level where
protracted negotiations are often a necessary pre-condition for
modest changes in agreements. The history of action in international fishery commission negotiations, such as ICNAF, is illustrative of this problem.
At first, it seems that the possible (probable) extension of national jurisdiction associated with the Law of the Sea Conference will
internalize some of these problems. At the national level, the price
mechanism, particularly if constrained by regulation, can be used
to protect certain interest-at least theoretically. Even here, however, second order problems will arise that will defy easy solution.
If by jurisdiction, a country gains control over a fishery, it must
assume the cost of management. Furthermore, if the stocks have
been utilized by other nations, there will be a problem of "phasing
out." This will include the difficulties faced by those "phased
out," the reallocation of effort to other fisheries, the exclusion of
third parties elsewhere as well as other problems. For instance, the
Icelandic solution, combined with a similar solution for the Faroes
plus extended Canadian and U.S. jurisdiction, may well result in a
massive reallocation problem in the North Atlantic, both East and
West, the effects of which may extend to the Pacific. For example,
if the Russians' fishing effort in the North Atlantic should be
heavily affected by jurisdictional extension, they may be forced
to re-examine their own position in the Pacific.
Another aspect of extension of jurisdiction is that the coastal
state must not only assume the management burden for what
heretofore has been an international fishery but also the burden of
"full utilization" of the resource. Since this would imply a signi-

ficant expansion in fishing effort in the case of the U.S. and Canada, it may be expeditious for these states to create a market of
sorts in fishery quotas. The existing system of national quotas
in ICNAF provides the basis for the development of such a system--a system which seems a priori to be preferable to continuous political negotiation over "phasing out" and "full utiliza-

tion" of stocks.
Theoretically, the price mechanism could also be utilized at the
national level to obviate the conflicts that arise from multiple use of
the coastal zone. Imperfections in the markets for ocean
resources, however, provide severe obstacles to the simple reliance
on the market system for optimum allocation. The concentration
of population in urban coastal areas and the resulting competition for scarce ocean space for power generation, waste disposal
and recreation serves as an example. The market for this space
is imperfect; public purchasers (municipalities) may not be as
well organized or as knowledgeable as private buyers (utilities);
there may be economies of scale in certain private uses; certain
purchasers may have longer time horizons or different social discount rates than individuals or local governments and different
uses might have substantial externalities. Left to the market, this
situation might lead to a condition where the supply of recreational land in proximity to an urban center would decline. Yet, it
may be vital for the political and social stability of the city that
the population retains easy access to recreational space. The failure of the market to accommodate these political and social needs
is one of the reasons why society cannot rely on the working of the
price mechanism in these circumstances.
The same difficulties exist at the international level. But there
they are compounded by several additional problems. The most
obvious of these is that different nations have different value systems and different price structures. Equally important is that
there is at least one use of the oceans, the military use, for which
no practical price proxy can be established. Both the U.S. and
the U.S.S.R. have indicated that they are unwilling to trade off
their military positions for any other package of goods at least
within any relevant range.
THE EcoNoMIcs OF THE

1V[ATAGEIMENT PROCESS

The preceding argument suggests the economic constraints that
must be considered in developing an ocean management program.
The high income elasticity of demand for ocean resources, particularly in view of different national growth rates, is highly rele-
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vant when predicting future development. Given the assumption
of a disproportionate rate of growth in demand, assessments based
on linear extrapolation from the past are bound to be too low.
Perhaps of even greater importance are the limitations imposed
by changing supply conditions. These will be the proving ground
for the quality and durability of international ocean agreements.
The option of bypassing the deterioration in quality and reduction
in quantity of one resource by shifting to readily available close
substitutes, as was done in fisheries, is disappearing. The availability of substitutes and the degree of substitutability are diminishing.
Also, the increasing interdependence of different uses is rapidly
restricting such solutions.
The interdependence of the different supply functions suggests
that one solution to the management problem may be in broadly
based agreements covering different competing uses. These broad
agreements would become not only a mere bargaining convenience
but a necessity required for the sake of effectiveness and stability.
One may consider the different uses as joint products and one must,
therefore, allow different countries to decide upon the relative
rates of output in accordance with the country's own priorities,
factor prices, time horizons and states of development. In sharp
contrast, partial agreements, which cover a limited range of resources and their accompanying outputs and which fix present
shares, will necessarily become less and less satisfactory to the signatory nations and, in time, will promote instability rather than
stability in the ocean management system.
Furthermore, it will be useful to have a trade off mechanism by
which different countries may exchange their different "allotments"
of different uses in accordance with their needs without the necessity of re-opening the general contract or agreement. Such an
ability to trade different outputs of the ocean among users and
over time presupposes the presence of a "pricing system"--at least
an implicit one. This, in turn, implies ethical judgments about the
adequacy of the existing wealth distribution and the shifts in the
distribution resulting from the bargaining (allocation) process.
There should exist no illusions about the likelihood of the establishment of such a "pricing" system. Therefore, there will be a

strong tendency to settle on second-best solutions, such as a broad
definition of national jurisdiction. A broad definition of territoriality would correspond to a situation in which the pricing problem
has been "solved" by internalizing it into every country's decisionmaking process. Under the best of circumstances, this would reduce
the pricing problem to an internal issue and remove the problem of
trade-offs between different uses from international consideration.
If a setting in which countries maintain a widespread foreign trade
covering many goods and services is assumed, the multiple uses
of the ocean whose relative shares have been established internally, become but one aspect of the foreign trade matrix that underlies bilateral and multilateral trade agreements. Furthermore, assuming a reasonably efficient market for ocean output, such a solution would reduce the need for international involvement in day
to day problems of regulation and, potentially, increase the pressure
for extractive efficiency.
But this solution with its highly appealing features has severe
drawbacks. For some countries, certain uses of the ocean are of
such importance to their national economies and/or to their foreign trade that the internalization of the pricing problem and the
incorporation of ocean use into the general foreign trade matrix is
theoretically a possible solution, but not particularly practical.
Also, the broader the definition of territorial claims and the resulting internalization of the pricing problem, the more detrimental
will the agreement be to land- and shelf-locked countries, unless
the agreement provides for explicit wealth redistribution. To the
extent that the extension of territorial claims is perceived as a
means of wealth redistribution from the richer to the poorer nations, it will be based on many precedents which will give it a
broad base of support and may make it acceptable. However, it
is not necessarily the most effective way to achieve this end. In
accepting the territorial claims, nations will be awarded the present value of the future returns of the corresponding outputs with
all the attached uncertainties. There is strong reason to believe
that this process is easily palatable because of substantial overestimates of the present values and/or underestimates of the costs of
making the claims. The overestimates occur because simultaneous
increases in output by many countries eager to exploit their newly
allotted wealth are, for obvious reasons, incompatible with present
prices. On the other hand, when costs of staking claims are disregarded or assumed to be zero, any possible source of revenue, as
uncertain and as low as its present value may be, is worth claiming.
Thus, facing the option of either bargaining over the hard core issue
of wealth distribution or accepting the risky outcome of a mechan-
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ical allotment process, most countries settle for the latter. Hence,
the hypothesis is offered that simple extension of territorial claims
will tend to worsen, not improve the international distribution of
income and wealth.
APPENDIX
I. Total worldwide oceanic gross product $60 billion.
I. The five main components of the total are:
1) Shipping and other surface uses;
2) Fishing and other exploitations of living resources;
3) Petroleum and gas exploitation;
4) Mining of minerals, and;
5) Recreation.
I1. 1) The use of the oceans for shipping-estimated at $40-50 billion
is by far the biggest component of the total. The shipping of oil,
gas, and bulks constitute 67% of the total tonnage. Recent data
have shown that international trade tends to grow faster than the
economies of the trading nations. Accordingly, one would expect
that the demand for shipping will increase at a disproportionately
high rate. However, the rapid increase in air freight-a close substitute-and the fact that bulk freight has exhibited substantial
economies of scale in the recent past will tend to act in the opposite direction. Also, recent time series tend to be biased upward
because of the closure of the Suez Canal with its resulting increases in costs and short term dislocations.
2) Fishing and other exploitations of living resources are estimated
at some $8 billion per year. At first, the seeming stability of the
per capita fish consumption in the U.S. (around 11 pounds per
year) seems to suggest that the income elasticity of fish is below
one. Even under these circumstances though, the total demand
will keep shifting to the right because of the increase in population. However, the constant overall per capita consumption of
fish covers distinct shifts in the demand patterns for individual
species. There has been a substantial shift toward species which
have exhibited substantial under-utilization in the past (mainly
tuna and fishmeal), thus substantially alleviating the price pressure. To the extent that the substitutability of under-utilized species will diminish, the price behavior will change drastically.
3) Offshore oil represents about 20% of the reserves and some 15%
of the output. Present capital spending is at the rate of over $1
billion per year. The value of offshore output is estimated at
some $6-8 billion per year. The high income elasticity of the demand for energy and the disproportionately high rate of growth
of offshore fields combine to sustain a high growth rate of this
sector of ocean use.
4) The mining of minerals is a negligible component. It is presently
estimated at $1 billion per year. Of this total, 20% is derived
in the U.S.; 35% of the total is estimated to be in the form of
coal mined through tunnels which start on land. An additional

5)

40% is derived from minerals extracted from the water column.
The recreational use of the ocean is estimated at some $4-5 billion per year in the U.S.
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